The aim of this paper is to examine the linkages Corporate Characteristics, Governance Attributes and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in the annual reports of listed companies of Bangladesh. The paper is based on a sample of 120 listed nonfinancial companies in Dhaka Stock Exchanges (DSE) 2008. The study is used ordinary least squares regression model to examine the relationship between explanatory variables and voluntary disclosure. Using an unweighted relative disclosure index for measuring voluntary disclosure, the empirical results indicate that a positive association between board size and voluntary disclosure, board leadership structure and voluntary disclosure and between board audit committee and voluntary disclosure. In contrast, the extent of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to proportion of INDs, ownership structure and net profitability.
Introduction
Corporate voluntary disclosure refers to information made available at the discretion of the corporation. The extent of voluntary disclosure is influenced by changes in the attitudes in society, economic factors and behavioral factors such as the particulars corporate culture. Voluntary disclosure items may be classified into historical, current and predictive items, depending on the past, present or envisaged performance of the company. In Bangladesh, both Company Act of 1994 and Securities and Exchange Rules of 1987 are two important legislations for corporate disclosure. The Companies Act 1994 provides the basic requirements for disclosure and reporting applicable to all companies incorporated in Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh, 1993) . The Act requires companies to prepare financial statements in order to reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), another regulatory body, requires all listed companies to comply with accounting standards promulgated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), in addition to its own disclosure provision (Government of Bangladesh, 1993) . Disclosure provisions of the Security Exchange Rules are, in fact, restricted only to companies listed on the stock exchanges. It is often alleged, however, that company annual reports do not comply with the disclosure requirements stipulated by the regulatory agencies, resulting in poor disclosure compliance by the listed company (Akhtaruddin, M.(2005) In addition, the Company Act requires companies to maintain proper books of account and to prepare and submit audited annual financial statements to their shareholders in order to reflect a "true and fair view" of the company's state of affairs. In terms of auditing, listed companies must prepare accounts in accordance with internationally accepted accounting principles and have them audited by independent auditors. Indeed, independent auditors' report has to be submitted in the company's annual general meeting (AGM) to the shareholders. The auditors shall report as to whether the relevant accounts show a true and fair view of the financial affairs of the body in question during the financial year in question and its assets and liabilities at the end of the year in question. Moreover, the auditor must audit the accounts of companies in light of generally accepted auditing standard (GAAS)
Statement of the Problem
The demand for published corporate disclosure of companies has increased worldwide as users of the information become more attentive. But frequently disclosure does not serve the need of the users because managers are likely to consider their own interests when exercising managerial judgment. In fact, this increases the disclosure gapthe difference between expected and actual disclosures. In other words, improved disclosure reduces the gap between management and the outside, enhances the value of stock in the capital market, increases liquidity, reduces cost and so on (Apostolos, K. et al. 2009; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 2009; Karim, 1996 .One great characteristic in corporate reporting is that a company generally provides information to release specific obligations: to society, investor, supplier, creditors and legal authorities. However, the decision to provide or not provide certain information is likely to be influenced by a variety of factors like independent directors, size, profitability, audit committee, board size, board leadership structure, ownership structure, leverage, family control and listing status to find out their links with disclosure. No such study was carried out with special reference to Bangladesh. Here, the study focuses the level of disclosure linking to firm size, profitability, independent nonexecutive director, board leadership structure, board audit committee, board size and ownership structure.
Objectives of the Study
The aim of this study is to examine the factors that influence companies to disclosure voluntary information in their annual reports of Bangladesh. The specific objectives of the proposed study are: 1. To measure the level of voluntary disclosure of information made by the listed companies in Bangladesh. 2. To examine the association between corporate characteristics, governances attributes and corporate voluntary disclosure levels of listed companies in Bangladesh.
Justification of the Study
In the present situation of world, Industrialization is a key factor for achieving overall economic development of a country. Additionally, Investor's and stakeholder's confidence if the any country can be taken mainly two steps. First step is to ensure a smooth flow of adequate, reliable, relevant and neutral information regarding the company's operating activities. It is possible only by establishing a sound corporate disclosure system. Second step is to implement good corporate governance practices in the corporate sectors. Corporate voluntary disclosure system that prevalent in the corporate sectors of Bangladesh is not suitable at all to meet the users' information need. Most of the companies cover up their voluntary disclosure as far as possible. They submit with legal provision relating to the voluntary disclosure in window dressed as well as cookedup their accounts.
Consequently, investor have lost their confidence about companies and abstained from more investment in the stock market, other stakeholders were also abstained from corporate behavior with the company. Similarly, good corporate governance is a vital issue for corporate success. But good governance is totally absent in the corporate sector of Bangladesh; rather there is a family culture in the governing activities of the joint stock company. As a result most of the users and all other the concern parties are not satisfied at all about the voluntary disclosure practices and governance activities in the corporate sector of Bangladesh. So for achieving economic development and surviving in the competitive business world, the above problem must be overcome as early as possible. It required through investigation of the causes responsible for improper voluntary disclosure and poor governance in the corporate sector of Bangladesh. However, some policy implication would be suggested so as restore the confidence of the investor and other stakeholder. Moreover, it is expected that finding of this study would be of great use of policy mater, planners, researcher and decision maker as well. 
Profitability
Managers are motivated to disclosure more detailed information to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration and to signal institutional confidence. Apostolos, K. et al., 2009; Karim, A.K.M.W., 1996; Simir, M., 2003; Meek, et al.(1995 suggest that profitability of the companies are expected to disclose more information about their performance. Bujaki and McConomy (2002) show that firm facing a slowdown in revenues tends to increase their disclosure of corporate governance practices. Moreover, firms suffering serious corporate governance failures tend to provide extensive disclosure of governance guideline implemented in the period after such failures. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a positive and significant association between the firm's profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure, which is consistent with the earlier (Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Kusumawati, D.N., 2006). Since the studies supporting positive relationship between profitability and disclosure are conducted in corporate disclosure field, the hypothesis of this study will be in the form of positive relationship. In this study, profitability as measured by return on assets; that is, net income divided by total assets. The following specific hypotheses have been tested regarding profitability of the firm:
The extent of voluntary disclosures is positively associated with the profitability of the firm.
Corporate Governance Attributes

Independent nonexecutive directors
A board is generally composed of inside and outside members. Inside members are selected from among the executive officers of a firm. They either belong to the management group or are the family that owns the firm. Outside directors are members whose only affiliation with the firm is their directorship. Empirical evidence on the importance of nonexecutive directors on board has been mixed. The outside directors are more effective than inside directors in maximizing shareholders' wealth. In contrast, the inside directors can contribute more to a firm than outside directors due to their firmspecific knowledge and expertise. Patelli, L., and A. Prencipe (2007), reported that composition of the board is one of several factors that can mitigate agency conflicts within the firm. Ros, H. & Terry, C. (2000) argument is that independent directors are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of executive directors who may engage in opportunistic behavior and also to ensure that managers are working in the best interest of the principal. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger proportion of independent directors are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure in Singapore. In addition, Chen and Jaggi (2002) examined the association between independent directors and corporate disclosure. They found a positive relationship between a board with a higher proportion of independent directors and comprehensive financial disclosure. These findings are consistent with agency theory tenets where a higher proportion of independent directors enhance voluntary financial reporting (Barako, et al., 2006) . The reason for this is that the presence of independent directors reduces the cost of voluntary disclosure because directors are generally independent of the daytoday business operations of the firm (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) . Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that an independent board serves as an important check and balance mechanism in enhancing boards' effectiveness. Support for these assertions is further provided by Barako 
Audit committee
Previous researches provides evidence of a positive association between the presence of an audit committee and corporate disclosure practices (Barako, D.G. et al., 2006; Rosario, M. and Flora, M. , 2005; Ho and Wong, 2001; McMullen,1996 . In additionally reported that the presence of an audit committee is associated with reliable financial reporting, such as, reduced incidence of errors, irregularities, and other indicators of unreliable reporting and audit committees are commonly viewed as monitoring mechanisms that enhance the audit attestation function of external financial reporting. The board usually delegates responsibility for the oversight of financial reporting to the audit committee to enhance the breadth of relevance and reliability of annual report (Wallace et al., 1995) . Thus, audit committees can be a monitoring mechanism that improves the quality of information flow between firm owners (shareholders and potential shareholders) and managers, especially in the financial reporting environment where the two have disparate information levels. Given the influence of audit committees on the context and content of corporate annual reports, the following hypothesis is tested
The level of voluntary disclosure is associated positively for firms that have an audit committee.
Board leadership structure
Within the context of corporate governance, the central issue often discussed is whether the chair of the board of directors and CEO positions should be held by different persons (dual leadership structure) or by one person (unitary leadership structure). According to agency theory, the combined functions (unitary leadership structure) can significantly impair the boards' most important function of monitoring, disciplining and compensating senior managers. It also enables the CEO to engage in opportunistic behavior, because of his/her dominance over the board. Forker (1992) empirically studied the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality, and presented evidence of a negative relationship between disclosure quality and 'dominant personality' (measured as CEO and board chair combined). Hence, to the extent that the combined chair/CEO positions "signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control" (Dulacha.G.B (2007) , the following hypothesis is examined:
The extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related for firms with a dual leadership structure.
Board Size
Board size may influence the level of voluntary disclosure. The level of disclosure is a strategic decision made of the board of directors. As a toplevel management body, the board of directors formulates policies and strategies to be followed by managers. It has been argued that a greater number of directors on the board may reduce the likelihood of information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) . Research emphasizes the importance of strategic information and resources in a highly uncertain environment. The size of the board is believed to affect the ability of the board to monitor and evaluate management and small board encourages faster information processing (Zahra, et al., 2000). Aktaruddin, M. et al., (2000) finding of their study is a positive association between board size and level of corporate voluntary disclosure. Further, the ability of directors to control and promote valuecreating activities is more likely to increase with the increase of directors on the board. With more directors, the collective experience and expertise of the board will increase, and therefore, the need for information disclosure will be higher. The following hypothesis is examined:
The number of directors on a board is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure.
Ownership structure
Ownership structure is another mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and managers The agency theory suggests that where there is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential for agency costs arises because of conflicts of interest between contracting parties. It is believed that agency problems will be higher in the widely held companies because of the diverse interests between contracting parties. By utilizing voluntary disclosure, managers provide more information to signal that they work in the best interests of shareholders.
In this study, ownership structure is proxied by management ownership. Using agency theory, it is argued that firms with higher management of ownership structure may disclose less information to shareholders through voluntary disclosure. It is because the determined ownership structure provides firms lower incentives to voluntarily disclose information to meet the needs of nondispersed shareholders groups. In Australia, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) note that companies with a single ownership structure disclose more voluntary information. Hossain et al. (2003) reported that lower management ownership and significant government ownership are associated with higher disclosure among listed firms in Singapore. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) indicate that the extent of family control in a firm is negatively associated with the amount of voluntary disclosure. Their evidence suggests that family controlled firms do not require additional information because the owner managers could access the information easily, thus leading to low agency costs and low information irregularity. The management entrenchment hypothesis could also explain the negative association and its effects could negate the positive effects of the agency cost explanations. The significant role of management ownership in influencing voluntary disclosures practices of firms from the prior researcher. So it is expected that ownership structure will influence the voluntary disclosure information. The hypothesis is formally stated as:
The extent of voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with a higher management ownership.
Research Methodology
Sample Selection and Data Sources
Sample is taken from annual reports of listed companies on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), all companies were considered for inclusive in the survey. The main criteria used for sampling the firms were: (i) annual reports must be available at the stock exchange and (ii) the firm must have been listed for the entire period of the study 2008.The companies listed on the DSE are classified into thirteen categories, just have taken here seventh categories i.e. engineering, food& allied, fuel & power, textile, pharmaceuticals & chemicals, tannery & paper and cement & ceramics and total sample companies is 120. The annual report of the sample companies is collected from the DSE seminal library by paying money. Corporategovernance attributes was collected from the annual reports of listed companies of DSE. The comparative distribution of the companies in the population and the sample are given in Table1.
Analysis of Data
In order to obtain the objectives of the research study, statistical tools like average, standard deviation, coefficient of variance, correlation, regressions &, T tests, F tests have been used to analyze and interpretation of the data through the Statistical Packages for Social Science(SPSS)14.0 for windows and Statistical Graphs, Tables and Charts have been used for data presentation.
Development of a Voluntary Disclosure Index
Previous research has examined the disclosure behavior of firms using a disclosure checklist. The disclosure checklist developed by Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) was used to examine the voluntary disclosure of firms in developed countries. Chau and Gray (2002) , and Ho and Wong (2001) have also used this disclosure checklist with some modifications to examine the voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong and Singapore firms. The level of voluntary disclosure of the sample firms in this study was measured using a disclosure index that was developed in consideration with the disclosure checklist used by Akhtaruddin A total of 91 items were identified in compliance with voluntary disclosure items provided by listed firms in Bangladesh. These items were then compared with listing requirements for Dhaka stock exchange (DSE) and a mandatory disclosure checklist prepared by Akhtaruddin, M. (2005) in Bangladesh. Since the focus of this research is voluntary disclosures, the preliminary list of 91 items was subjected to a through selection to eliminate those that are mandated. This list was sent to various experts (professor, Professional Chartered accounted & Cost and Management accounted etc.) for selection and as a result of their feedback, the initial list of 91 items was reduced to 68 items. The disclosure items are classified into thirteen categories: general corporate information, corporate strategic information, corporate governance information, financial information, financial review information, foreign currency information, segmental information, employee information, research & development information, future forecast information, share price information, social responsibility information and graphical information.(A list of the final 68 items is included in Appendix1) I employed an unweighted approach for this study. This approach is most appropriate when no importance is given to any specific usergroups (Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1994; Akhtaruddin, M. et al., 2009; Hossain, M. and Hammami, H.,2009). The items of information are numerically scored on a dichotomous basis. According to the unweighted disclosure approach, a firm is scored "1" for an item disclosed in the annual report and "0" if it is not disclosed. The total voluntary disclosure index (TVDX) is then computed for each sample firm as a ratio of the total disclosure score to the maximum possible disclosure by the firm. The disclosure index for each firm is then expressed as a percentage. 
Hypothesis Test
The following is the general form of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model which has been fitted to the data in order to assess the effect of each variable on the disclosure data associated with the aggregate disclosure index and to test the associated hypothesizes: 
PEOI =Percentage of equity owned by the insiders to all equity of the firm.
NPA =Net Profit ability of the firm a = total constant, and e = the error term The table2 shows the number and percentages of companies whose disclosure score is within the specified range. 2.50 % companies disclose voluntary information less than of 20 %; 28.33% companies disclosure in the range of (3140) % and 25.83%,11.67% companies disclose voluntary information in the range of (4150)% and (6170)% respectively. 1.67% companies disclose more than 80% information in the annual reports of listed companies of Bangladesh. On aggregate, the voluntary disclosure of director's information is medium. (2008) in Kuwait (46%). The mean of the proportion of independent nonexecutive directors (PIND) to the directors on the board is 9.72% with standard deviation is 8.61%.The average board size (BSZE) is 6.68 with minimum and maximum sizes of 3 and 13 respectively. The average firm size is (Taka Bangladeshi) Tk.27020.80 lakh and Tk.18318.83lakh respectively in terms of total assets (TA) and total sales (TSE).The average ownership structure is 21.71% with standard deviation is19.76%.The statistics on the net profitability (NPA) indicate that a small portion of sample firms show negative returns.
Result and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Pearson Correlation analysis
Table4 provides the Pearson productmoment correlation coefficients of the continuous explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable included in the survey. The result of Pearson productmoment correlation exposed that board leadership structure, board size, board audit committee, total assets are positively related with voluntary disclosure (P<0.01, Two tailed), but Percentage of equity owned by the insiders to all equity of the firm is negatively related with voluntary disclosure(P<0.01, Two tailed). Percentage of Independent Directors is positively related with voluntary disclosure (P<0.05, Two tailed). Board audit committee is positively related with PIND and BLS at the level of (P<0.01, Two tailed).Total assets is positively related with BLS (P<0.01, Two tailed) and BSZE (P<0.05, Two tailed). Total Sales is also positively related with BSZE (P<0.01, Two tailed) and TA (P<0.05, Two tailed). Percentage of equity owned by the insiders to all equity of the firm is negatively related with BLS, BAC, TA (P<0.01, Two tailed) and BSZE (P<0.05, Two tailed).Net profitability is positively related with BLS, BSZE and negatively related with PEOI at the level of (P<0.05, Two tailed). The most significant corporate governance variable is ownership structure. The regression coefficient for the variable is 0.576, which is negative and statistically significant at the 0.000 level (P<0.01, twotailed). This result suggests that the hypothesis H 8 
Multiple Regression Analysis
Conclusions
This research is an extension of previous research where a set of corporate governance variables is considered to examine their association with the level of voluntary disclosure. The objective of this study was to examine corporate governance factors and their influence on voluntary disclosure. These factors include Proportion of independent nonexecutive directors on the board, board leadership structure, board size , board audit committee, firm's size, Percentage of equity owned by the insiders to all equity of the firm and Profit ability of the firm. In particular, the study aimed to determine which of these factors were significantly related to increased disclosure. The study used the disclosure index to measure voluntary disclosure on a sample of 120 listed non financial companies of Bangladesh. The first hypothesis of the study was a higher proportion of independent nonexecutive directors on a board is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. But findings of my result show that it is negatively related to proportion of independent nonexecutive directors. The results of the study show that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related for firms with a dual leadership structure. The findings of this research support it more that higher number of directors on a board is higher voluntary disclosure and the level of voluntary disclosure is associated positively for firms that have an audit committee. The result of the study also support that firms with higher proportion of internal management ownership structure disclose less information to shareholders through voluntary disclosure which is similar to my hypothesis. 
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